The Immorality requirement for life's meaning

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dc.contributor.author Metz, Thaddeus
dc.date.accessioned 2009-03-17T10:12:33Z
dc.date.available 2009-03-17T10:12:33Z
dc.date.issued 2009-03-17T10:12:33Z
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10210/2285
dc.description Ratio XVI, 2 June 2003 en
dc.description.abstract Many religious thinkers hold the immortality requirement, the view that immortality of some kind is necessary for life to have meaning. After clarifying the nature of the immortality requirement, this essay examines three central arguments for it. The article establishes that existing versions of these arguments fail to entail the immortality requirement. The essay then reconstructs the arguments, and it shows that once they do plausibly support the immortality requirement, they equally support the God-centred requirement, the view that God's existence is a necessary condition for life to be meaningful. The paper concludes by explaining why we should expect any argument for the immortality requirement also to constitute an argument for the God-centred requirement. en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.rights Copyright approved by Blackwell Publishing Ltd en
dc.subject Meaning of life en
dc.subject Death en
dc.subject Immortality en
dc.subject God en
dc.subject Supernaturalism en
dc.title The Immorality requirement for life's meaning en
dc.type Article en

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